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Abstract 
This article examines the legal nature of the principles of impartiality and neutrality of 
humanitarian action, focussing on States as humanitarian actors. It argues that international 
law does not provide a general legal basis for the universal applicability of these principles, 
contrary to a common interpretation of the ICJ’s 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua case. 
Nevertheless, impartiality and neutrality may have significant legal effect on the conduct of 
States. They may be directly binding on States through the operation of Security Council 
resolutions drafted in mandatory language. In addition, they may have indirect effect due to 
the States’ obligation to respect the adherence to the principles by humanitarian 
organizations. On the basis of this argument, the article pleads for increased conceptual 
clarity and, in turn, effectiveness of humanitarian action. 
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In spite of its crucial significance for the unification of Italy, the battle of Solferino between 
France and Austria in 1859 is now better known as an historical watershed event marking the 
onset of modern humanitarianism. By organizing assistance to the thousands of wounded 
soldiers left on the battlefield, Swiss businessman Henry Dunant laid the foundations for the 
Fundamental Principles of humanitarian action. “He negotiated access, he chose to act 
impartially, he used his position of neutrality, and he organized civil society in a voluntary, 
non-coerced fashion.”1 Dunant’s selfless acts and his impassioned book A Memory of 
Solferino
2
 inspired, among many other things, the formulation of modern humanitarian 
principles.
3
 
In virtually any rendition,
4
 these principles include the principles of impartiality and 
neutrality of humanitarian assistance.
5
 Naturally, their significance in times of armed conflict 
                                                          
1
 Peter Walker and Daniel G. Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World, Routledge, New York, 2014, p. 22. 
2
 Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, ICRC, Geneva, 1986 (original, French edition first published in 1862). 
3
 See generally Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, Henry Dunant Institute, 
Geneva, 1979; see also Daniel Thürer, “Dunant’s Pyramid: Thoughts on the ‘Humanitarian Space’”, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, 2007, p. 50 (“It is striking how the story that Dunant 
tells already contains in embryonic form all those elements that are later to constitute the form and 
organizational system of the Red Cross and, to some extent, of other humanitarian organizations.”); Michael 
Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Cornell University Press, New York, 2011, p. 1 
(“The Battle of Solferino became to modern humanitarianism what the Treaty of Westphalia was to modern 
politics.”); but see ibid., pp. 78–79 (noting that Dunant was not a lone voice at the time and that there had been 
others before him who had advocated for the improvement of medical relief in wartime). 
4
 Most attempts to list humanitarian principles contain at least the following four: humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, and independence. See, e.g., Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), The 2010 HAP 
Standard in Accountability and Quality Management, 2
nd
 ed., Geneva, 2010, p. 8, available at: 
http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/2010-hap-standard-in-accountability.pdf (all internet references were 
accessed in July 2015); Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), What are Humanitarian 
Principles?, June 2012, p. 1, available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-
humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf; Core Humanitarian Standard, Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality 
and Accountability, 2014, p. 8, available at: 
http://www.corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf. 
These four humanitarian principles are derived from the Fundamental Principles guiding the work of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, proclaimed in 1965 in Vienna. See XX
th
 International Conference of the 
Red Cross, “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 5, No. 56, November 1965, pp. 573–574.  
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cannot be overstated. Assistance provided exclusively to one party to the conflict or denied to 
some of the victims only because of their race, ethnicity, or sex would not only lead to 
justified criticism on moral grounds, but it may also worsen human suffering during wartime, 
contribute to the escalation of conflicts, and undermine the efficiency of humanitarian action 
in general.  
Despite their undoubted importance, the normative nature of the principles remains little 
understood. Although they are sometimes described as binding on States and other 
humanitarian actors
6
 as a matter of international law, such assertions are usually accompanied 
by little or no analysis as to their specific legal basis.
7
 This state of affairs may to some extent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 For a definition of these principles, see text to notes 15–18 below. The principle of neutrality of humanitarian 
assistance should be distinguished from neutrality as the status of a State which is not participating in an 
international armed conflict. In the present article, the term “neutrality” is used only in the former sense. For a 
general overview of the law of neutrality in the latter sense, see, e.g., Michael Bothe, “The Law of Neutrality”, 
in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013, p. 549. For the overlaps between neutrality as a humanitarian principle and the law of neutrality, see 
Denise Plattner, “ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 36, No. 311, April 1996, pp. 163–165. 
6
 References to “humanitarian actors” throughout the text should be read broadly as encompassing all actors 
involved in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid, including States, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and private entities. In the same vein, see, e.g., Toni Pfanner, “Humanitarian 
Actors: Editorial”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, March 2007, p. 5 (“Multiple 
humanitarian actors with different objectives, principles and modi operandi intervene in situations of armed 
conflict and internal violence in order to alleviate the plight of the victims of those situations: governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, [N]ational Red Cross and Red Crescent [S]ocieties, 
private companies and even the armed forces.”). 
7
 See, e.g., Marion Harroff-Tavel, “Neutrality and Impartiality—The Importance of these Principles for the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them”, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, December 1989, p. 550; Maurice Torrelli, “From 
Humanitarian Assistance to ‘Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds’?”, International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 32, No. 288, June 1992, p. 239; François Bugnion, “Red Cross Law”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 35, No. 308, October 1995, p. 507; Vincent Chetail, “The Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 850, June 
2003, p. 265; Sylvain Beauchamp, “Defining The Humanitarian Space Through Public International Law”, On 
the Edges of Conflict Working Paper, 2008, p. 14; François Bugnion, “The International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent: Challenges, Key Issues and Achievements”, International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 91, No. 876, December 2009, p. 702. Some of the authors seek this legal basis in the ICJ’s judgment on the 
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be explained by the perceived moral desirability of the two principles. It is undisputed that a 
convincing moral case can be made in favour of the impartial and neutral character of any 
humanitarian aid. Nonetheless, more is needed to establish the legal validity of any norm 
under international law.  
The importance of understanding the normative nature of humanitarian principles is 
particularly pressing in modern-day conflicts characterized by the asymmetry of belligerent 
parties
8
 and the proliferation of humanitarian actors.
9
 The militarily more powerful party to a 
conflict now typically finds itself taking on a multiplicity of tasks going beyond strict military 
engagement.
10
 These frequently involve activities previously reserved to a handful of 
humanitarian organizations committed to a similar set of values.
11
 In this connection, 
concerns have appeared about the alleged “blurring of the lines” between military, political, 
and humanitarian efforts.
12
 Today, States, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, and 
others compete to achieve their goals in an increasingly shrinking humanitarian space.
13
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
merits in the Nicaragua case. It will be shown below that this ruling does not provide a satisfactory justification 
for such a conclusion and amounts to little more than an instance of judicial fiat: see text to notes 28–43 below. 
8
 See further Toni Pfanner, “Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and 
Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005, pp. 149–174.  
9
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ferris, “Megatrends and the Future of Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, December 2011, pp. 935–936. 
10
 See, e.g., Antonio Donini, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Integration or Independence of Humanitarian 
Action?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, March 2011, pp. 149–151 (describing these 
so-called “comprehensive” approaches to conflict resolution undertaken by the western forces in Afghanistan 
after 2002). 
11
 See also text to notes 134–140 below (outlining the nature, aims, and objectives of the so-called “Dunantist” 
humanitarian agencies). 
12
 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and 
Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts”, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, Vol. 17, 2004, p. 64; Alice Gadler, “Armed Forces as Carrying both the Stick and the 
Carrot? Humanitarian Aid in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq”, Goettingen Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, p. 231; A. Donini, above note 10, pp. 156–157; Claudia McGoldrick, 
“The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, 
No. 884, December 2011, p. 966. 
13
 See, e.g., Cynthia Brassard-Boudreau and Don Hubert, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and 
Prospects on Security and Access”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 24 November 2010, available at: 
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/863.  
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extent to which international law constrains the activities of these diverse humanitarian actors 
therefore demands close attention. 
The aim of this article is to address this need by scrutinizing the position of the principles 
of impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action in international law. In particular, the 
article challenges the view that a general legal basis underpinning both principles exists in 
international law with a resulting binding effect on all humanitarian actors in their activities. 
The analysis focusses on States as humanitarian actors and it further explores the effect of the 
principles on States’ interaction with other stakeholders including the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC). 
The article proceeds in three consecutive steps. First, it defines and distinguishes the 
notions of impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action. Second, the article analyses 
whether a general legal basis providing for the universal applicability of the two principles 
may be found in one of the three principal sources of international law set out in Article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ): treaties, customary international law 
and general principles of law. Third, the article examines whether the principles may produce 
legal effects for the conduct of States even without such a legal basis. It considers the 
potential direct effect of UN Security Council resolutions demanding compliance with the 
principles as well as the indirect effect brought about by the States’ obligation to respect the 
adherence to the principles by humanitarian organizations. 
(Head 1) Conceptualization of the principles of impartiality and neutrality  
Although the principles of impartiality and neutrality support and reinforce each other, the 
difference between them should be noted at the outset. It is true that in general parlance, the 
two principles are frequently used as synonyms; indeed, dictionaries often use one to define 
the other.
14
 However, in the field of humanitarian action each carries a separate meaning and, 
as will be shown, is of a different legal nature. 
                                                          
14
 See, e.g., “Neutral”, Thesaurus.com, available at: http://thesaurus.com/browse/neutral  (“Definition: impartial, 
noncommital”) (emphasis added); Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley (eds), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 6
th
 ed., West Publishing, St. Paul, 1990, p. 1042 (defining the term “Neutral” as the state or quality 
of being “[i]ndifferent; unbiased; impartial”) (emphasis added). 
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On the one hand, the principle of neutrality is a macro-level principle of abstention. It 
requires the provider of humanitarian action to abstain from associating with the ideological 
or political aims of any of the parties to the conflict. It is the embodiment of the idea that 
humanitarian actors must remain ideologically free and they may not take sides in political or 
religious controversies.
15
  
The principle of impartiality, on the other hand, is a micro-level principle of action. It 
requires that all humanitarian action be undertaken only on the basis of, and in proportion to, 
the need of the victims. In line with Jean Pictet’s useful systematization, it can thus be better 
seen as a set of the three intertwined but separate sub-principles of non-discrimination, 
proportionality and impartiality stricto sensu.
16
 It has been suggested that impartiality also 
operates (or should operate) on a global scale in the form of a demand for equitable treatment 
of victims of all conflicts.
17
 However, in this article, impartiality is understood in its 
                                                          
15
 See further J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 34–39; Hugo Slim, “Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: 
Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity”, Development in Practice, Vol. 7, No. 4, 
November 1997, p. 347; M. Harroff-Tavel, above note 7, p. 537; K. Anderson, above note 12, p. 56; Ruth Abril 
Stoffels, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps”, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 542–544.  
16
 J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 24–33. Pictet understood non-discrimination as the avoidance of “distinction or 
segregation which one makes to the detriment of certain other persons, for the sole reason that they belong to 
some specific category” (p. 24); proportionality as the endeavour “to relieve the suffering of individuals in 
proportion to the degree of their suffering and to give priority according to the degree of urgency” (p. 27); and 
impartiality stricto sensu as the provision of aid “without taking sides, either for reasons of interest or 
sympathy” (p. 31). 
17
 cf. Yves Sandoz, “Foreword”, in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC 
Customary Law Study), p. xiv (“For the ICRC, impartiality means not only avoiding discrimination between the 
different victims of a given conflict, but also constantly striving to ensure that all the victims of all the conflicts 
on the planet are treated equitably, without regional or ethnic preference and independently of the emotions 
sparked by media-selected images.”) (emphasis added); see also Dirk Salomons, “The Perils of Dunantism: The 
Need for a Rights-Based Approach to Humanitarianism”, in Andrej Zwitter, Christopher K. Lamont, Hans-
Joachim Heintze and Joost Herman (eds), Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal 
Responses, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 41 (arguing that true impartiality would “require a 
methodology whereby we could compare relative needs on a global scale, assessing the relative value of helping 
flood victims in Pakistan versus providing food aid for the victims of famine in East Africa”). 
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traditional sense of a victim-oriented micro-level principle of humanitarian action with 
impact on conduct within a particular armed conflict.
18
 
Together, the two principles “serve the overarching goal of humanity” by their 
operational and instrumental nature.
19
 It is sometimes said that aid given to one side of the 
conflict does not necessarily have to be in violation of these principles.
20
 To some extent, this 
is obviously true. A humanitarian actor should not be expected to provide a strictly equal 
amount of aid to both sides. Such a goal might not reflect the size of the affected population 
or the need of the victims. After all, a conflict may disproportionately affect the population in 
a territory controlled by one conflict party only, while leaving the situation relatively stable 
for those on the territory of the other side. For instance, it would be absurd to claim that 
humanitarian aid distributed in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the 1999 aerial 
bombing campaign would not have been neutral and/or impartial unless matched by equal 
assistance to the NATO countries.
21
  
Nevertheless, unilateral actions undertaken on the basis of the nationality of the victims 
or their other association with one conflict party should be seen as prima facie inconsistent 
with the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Such assistance takes into account an 
extraneous consideration other than the need of the victims and thus lends itself to an 
                                                          
18
 See further J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 24–33; H. Slim, above note 15, pp. 348–349; M. Harroff-Tavel, above 
note 7, pp. 537–538; K. Anderson, above note 15, p. 56; R. A. Stoffels, above note 15, pp. 540–541. 
19
 D. Thürer, above note 3, p. 55. 
20
 See, e.g., Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. 818, para. 2803; Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, 
New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, p. 486; Frits Kalshoven, “Impartiality and Neutrality 
in Humanitarian Law and Practice”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, December 1989, 
pp. 523–524. 
21
 Whether relief provided in relation to the 1999 conflict did in fact comply with all humanitarian principles is a 
separate question. For criticism of the western involvement in the conflict from this angle, see, e.g., Toby Porter, 
“The partiality of humanitarian assistance – Kosovo in comparative perspective”, Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance, 17 June 2000, available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/150 (arguing that the principle of 
impartiality “was compromised or even discarded during the Kosovo crisis”).  
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accusation of partiality.
22
 It additionally specifically assists one side of the conflict only and 
thus impinges on the principle of neutrality.
23
  
The ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions seems to 
take the opposite view, arguing that a “unilateral action cannot be considered as indicating a 
lack of neutrality”.24 The explanation in the commentary is remarkably frank, stating that 
“traditional links, or even the geographical situation, may prompt a State to undertake such 
actions, and it would be stupid to wish to force such a State to abandon the action”.25 It is, 
however, difficult to see what would be left, in particular of the principle of neutrality, if a 
humanitarian actor could escape an accusation of a violation simply by remaining silent about 
its true incentives.  
It is suggested in response that the better view is to separate the question whether such 
conduct breaches the principles and the question whether that would mean that the State must 
abandon the action (which depends on the normative nature of the principle in question). As 
will be shown, in the present state of international law, there is no general requirement for 
States to abide by the principles at all times, and thus assistance of the kind suggested in the 
ICRC Commentary may still be permissible in law despite not being neutral in principle. 
(Head 1) Search for a general legal basis of the principles of impartiality and neutrality 
If one accepts that impartiality and neutrality are essential for the furtherance of “the 
overarching goal of humanity” on the international plane,26 one would be forgiven for 
                                                          
22
 See, e.g., D. Salomons, above note 17, p. 43 (criticizing humanitarian assistance disbursed to persons in 
Darfur at the expense of those living in other parts of the Republic of Sudan); Fiona Terry, Condemned to 
Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2013, pp. 74–75 (criticizing 
assistance provided by the United States during the Afghan conflict in the 1980s as aimed at the strengthening 
of the resistance forces and even specific commanders). 
23
 See, e.g., S. Neil MacFarlane, “Humanitarian Action and Conflict”, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4, 
Autumn 1999, pp. 543–544 (criticizing the majority of humanitarian assistance provided during the Spanish 
Civil War as one-sided and thus decidedly “non-neutral” due to the politicization of many contemporary 
humanitarian actors). 
24
 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and A. Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 818, para. 2803. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 D. Thürer, above note 3, p. 55; see also text to note 19 above. 
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assuming that these principles must be firmly anchored in the binding corpus of international 
law. This is also, as will be seen, a frequent interpretation of the ICJ’s judgment on the merits 
in the Nicaragua case.
27
 Accordingly, this section revisits the relevant part of the Nicaragua 
judgment to unpack the analysis provided by that Court. It then considers whether any of the 
three main sources of international law—treaties, custom, and general principles of law—can 
be said to provide a general legal basis for the two principles. 
(Head 2) Nicaragua revisited 
In Nicaragua, the ICJ had to decide on the lawfulness of the assistance provided by the US 
government in the early 1980s to the contras fighting against the Nicaraguan government.
28
 
Notably for the present purposes, the assistance in question was provided by a State, not by a 
humanitarian organization or any other non-State actor. In the first step of its analysis, the 
Court asserted that humanitarian assistance could not be seen “as in any … way contrary to 
international law” as long as it was in line with the principles of humanity and impartiality 
declared by the Twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross.
29
 However, on the facts 
of the case, the US assistance was limited to one side of the conflict only and thus it was, the 
Court observed, not “given without discrimination to all in need in Nicaragua, [but] merely to 
the contras and their dependents”.30 In the second step of its reasoning, the Court held that 
this amounted to an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and ultimately a violation 
of international law by the US.
31
  
                                                          
27
 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. 
28
 See ibid., para. 20. 
29
 Ibid., para. 242. The present name of the conference is the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent. It brings together governments, policy makers, and the components of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement (“the Movement”). See further ICRC, “International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent”, 27 September 2014, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-conference-red-
cross-and-red-crescent.  
30
 Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 243. 
31
 Ibid., paras. 246 and 292(3). 
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The ICJ judgment thus appeared to require any actor providing humanitarian assistance 
to abide by the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
32
 In this connection, it should be 
mentioned that the ruling spoke expressly only of the principles of humanity and 
impartiality.
33
 However, in its analysis of the facts of the case, the Court placed the greatest 
emphasis on the fact that aid was disbursed to one side of the conflict only.
34
 In this sense, the 
US conduct primarily amounted to a breach of the principle of neutrality due to the not-so-
subtle US alignment with the political and ideological aims of one conflict party.
35
  
The ICJ did not, however, cite any law in support of its analysis in this part of the 
judgment apart from the declaration of the Fundamental Principles of the Movement
36
 which 
it (correctly) did not describe as legally binding with respect to either of the parties to the 
dispute.
37
 In fact, the Court merely stated that it is “[a]n essential feature of truly 
humanitarian aid” that it is provided without any discrimination (thus invoking an aspect38 of 
the principle of impartiality).
39
 The ICJ all but admitted that its position amounts to little 
more than judicial fiat in the following sentence, which it opened simply with the words “In 
the view of the Court…”.40  
In spite of these deficiencies, the judgment has been widely interpreted as confirming the 
mandatory legal nature of the principles in question for humanitarian actors both public and 
private. In particular, it has been described as having recognized the general binding force of 
the Fundamental Principles of the Movement,
41
 as laying down “the essential conditions for 
                                                          
32
 Accord F. Kalshoven, above note 20, pp. 517–519. This is also how the ruling has been interpreted by 
proponents of the extensive view: see notes 41–43 below.  
33
 Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 242. 
34
 See also D. Plattner, above note 5, p. 176 (viewing this passage in the judgment as confirming an aspect of the 
principle of neutrality).  
35
 See text to note 15 above. 
36
 See “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, above note 4. 
37
 cf. Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 242. 
38
 For Jean Pictet’s classification of the three subprinciples of the principle of impartiality, see note 16 above. 
39
 Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 243. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 V. Chetail, above note 7, p. 265 (“the Court not only confirms the customary character of the fundamental 
principles of the Red Cross, but considers that these principles have to be respected with regard to any kind of 
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all humanitarian action”42 and as providing “a source of obligations for states themselves, if 
[they] claim to be engaged in humanitarian activity”.43 Therefore, it is necessary to 
investigate whether the legal basis for the two principles could be properly located in any of 
the three main sources of international law. Accordingly, each of the following subsections 
examines one of these sources.  
(Head 2) Treaties: Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
The treaty law relating to the provision of humanitarian relief in times of armed conflict 
includes primarily the four Geneva Conventions
44
 and their two Additional Protocols.
45
 With 
the exception of one provision replicated in all four Conventions—designated as Common 
Article 3—the Conventions and the First Additional Protocol apply in situations of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
humanitarian assistance, whether it is provided by the Red Cross, or through the United Nations or by States 
individually”). 
42
 M. Torrelli, above note 7, p. 239 (emphasis added). 
43
 F. Bugnion, “The International Conference”, above note 7, p. 702 (“The International Court of Justice thus 
clearly recognized the mandatory force of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross; they not only oblige 
states to allow Red Cross and Red Crescent bodies to abide by them, but they are also a source of obligations for 
states themselves, if the latter claim to be engaged in humanitarian activity.”). 
44
 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC I); Geneva 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC II); Geneva 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC III); Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC 
IV). 
45
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (hereinafter 
AP I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 
December 1978) (hereinafter AP II). 
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international armed conflict.
46
 Conversely, Common Article 3 and the entirety of the Second 
Additional Protocol apply in non-international armed conflicts.
47
  
(Head 3) Principle of impartiality 
To begin with, this body of treaty law does not contain any general endorsement of either 
principle with respect to all humanitarian action undertaken in situations of armed conflict. 
Of the two, the position of impartiality is more prominent in the instruments, with several 
provisions mentioning this principle expressly.
48
 However, these provisions do not endow the 
principle with a general binding force with respect to all humanitarian actors. Instead, they 
serve two principal functions. 
First, the relevant provisions in the Geneva Conventions that refer to impartiality use it 
mainly as a defining characteristic of humanitarian bodies which are to be given access to 
victims of war.
49
 For instance, Article 59(2) of Geneva Convention IV provides that relief 
schemes on behalf of the occupied population may be undertaken “either by States or by 
impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross”.50 That means that only bodies whose “impartiality is assured”51 are legally privileged 
in the sense that they are entitled to free passage and protection of their relief consignments.
52
 
Second, the two Additional Protocols stipulate that in case of a lack of supplies essential 
for the survival of the civilian population, “humanitarian and impartial” relief actions “shall 
be undertaken”.53 These provisions, however, do not designate the subject of this obligation 
nor do they forbid assistance that would not meet the criterion of impartiality. Undoubtedly, 
                                                          
46
 Common Art. 2 to the GCs; Art. 1(3) of AP I. 
47
 Common Art. 3 to the GCs; Art. 1(1) of AP II. 
48
 See, in particular, Common Art. 3(2) to the GCs; Common Art. 9/9/9/10 to the GCs; Arts. 59(2) and 61(1) of 
GC IV; Art. 70(1) of AP I; Art. 18(2) of AP II. 
49
 Common Art. 3(2) to the GCs; Common Art. 9/9/9/10 to the GCs; Arts. 59(2) and 61(1) of GC IV. 
50
 Art. 59(2) of GC IV (emphasis added). 
51
 Jean Pictet (ed.), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: 
Commentary, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 321. 
52
 Art. 59(3) of GC IV; see also J. Pictet, above note 51, pp. 321–322. 
53
 Art. 70(1) of AP I; Art. 18(2) of AP II; see also HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare, Bern, 2009, rule 100(a). 
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the prohibition of adverse distinction in the application of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) is one of the fundamental tenets of this body of law.
54
 However, it should be recalled 
that this prohibition corresponds to the subprinciple of non-discrimination only and does not 
cover the entire scope of impartiality.
55
 Therefore, to the extent that the rules in question are 
to apply generally, the relevant phrase should be seen as exhortatory only, encouraging relief 
action of the kind described, but not requiring in itself that such aid be in fact provided by a 
specific actor designated ex ante.  
Nevertheless, the modifiers “humanitarian and impartial” are certainly not without any 
legal effect. Assistance that meets the said criteria is privileged and protected under the terms 
of the Protocols. In the context of international armed conflicts, Protocol I expressly provides 
that “[o]ffers of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as 
unfriendly acts.”56 This serves to address potential claims by the territorial State to that effect 
and exclude them as a legal basis of objections to humanitarian action.
57
 In the context of 
non-international armed conflicts, no corresponding stipulation has found its way into the text 
of the second Additional Protocol.
58
 Nonetheless, assistance which meets these criteria must 
be perceived as endorsed by the Protocol
59
 and hence can only be refused by the territorial 
State for reasons that are neither arbitrary nor capricious.
60
 
                                                          
54
 See Common Art. 3 to the GCs; Art. 16 of GC III; Art. 13 of GC IV; Art. 75(1) of AP I; Art. 4(1) of AP II; 
ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, p. 308, rule 88. 
55
 See text to notes 16–18 above and particularly note 16 above (detailing Pictet’s classification of the 
subprinciples of the principle of impartiality). 
56
 Art. 70(1) of AP I. 
57
 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, p. 486. 
58
 cf. Art. 18 of AP II. 
59
 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and A. Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 1479, paras. 4882–4883. 
60
 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, pp. 800–801; see also Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and A. 
Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 1479, para. 4885 (the refusal of humanitarian and impartial relief without good 
grounds may amount to a violation of the prohibition of the use of starvation as a method of combat); 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, San 
Remo, 2006, available at: 
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf, p. 61, para. 
5.1.4 (measures taken by the conflict party in control of an area should not unduly impede or delay the provision 
of humanitarian assistance); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, p. 193, rule 55 (“parties to the conflict 
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 (Head 3) Principle of neutrality 
In contrast to impartiality, the principle of neutrality of humanitarian action is not expressly 
mentioned in the text of the Geneva Conventions or their Protocols. To some extent, this can 
be explained due to the fact that the notion of neutrality already carries a different contextual 
connotation in the law of armed conflict, namely as a reference to the law of neutrality and 
the drafters may have wanted to avoid confusion between these two terms.
61
  
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that the principle of neutrality of humanitarian 
action does not feature at all in the treaty framework of IHL. Both the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I refer to “fundamental principles of the Red Cross” in a number of 
provisions.
62
 Interestingly, the formulation of these principles at the time of drafting of the 
Geneva Conventions did not yet expressly include the principle of neutrality.
63
 It was first 
included at the 25
th
 session of the Board of Governors of the Red Cross
64
 in 1959
65
 and 
incorporated into the present-day list of seven fundamental principles in 1965 (comprising the 
principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and 
universality).
66
 Therefore, at least since 1965, neutrality has been accepted as one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is 
impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control”). 
61
 Kate Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian 
Policy Group (HPG) Report No. 5, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, March 2000, p. 8. For the 
difference and overlaps between these two meanings of “neutrality”, see further note 5 above and the references 
cited therein. 
62
 Art. 44(2) of GC I; Art. 63(1)(a) of GC IV; Art. 81(2)–(3) of AP I. 
63
 See Board of Governors, XIX
th
 Session, Oxford, 1946, Resolution 12 and Board of Governors, XX
th
 Session, 
Stockholm, 1948, Resolution 7, reproduced in ICRC, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, 14
th
 ed., ICRC, Geneva, 2008, pp. 723–724. 
64
 In 1979, this body was replaced by the General Assembly of the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies. 
65
 Board of Governors, XXV
th
 Session, Athens, 1959, Resolution 16, reproduced in ICRC, Handbook, above 
note 63, pp. 724–725 (“it is essential for the Red Cross to observe strict neutrality in political spheres”). 
66
 “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, above note 4, pp. 573–574. The text was 
further revised in 1986 in order to replace references to “Red Cross” for “Movement”. For this final version, see 
ICRC, “The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement”, 31 October 
1986, available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/red-cross-crescent-movement/fundamental-
principles-movement-1986-10-31.htm. 
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Fundamental Principles of the Movement and it can thus be said that the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol I indirectly recognize this principle, as well.  
However, this does not mean that the treaties somehow elevate neutrality or any of the 
other principles to become principles of general application. Instead, the provisions in 
question should properly be read as conditioning the duty of States to facilitate access to 
components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement upon these components’ 
compliance with their own principles. Oddly, Additional Protocol I refers to these principles 
with respect to the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
67
 and the League (now 
Federation) of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
68
 but not the ICRC.
69
 Nevertheless, the 
ICRC made it clear in the text of its own commentary to Protocol I that as “the traditional 
guardian of the Movement’s principles”, it considers itself equally bound to observe these 
principles.
70
  
As with the specific principle of impartiality discussed above, the treaty framework does 
not generalize the applicability of the Fundamental Principles of the Movement to all 
humanitarian actors. With respect to “other humanitarian organizations”, Additional Protocol 
I merely stipulates that they conduct their activities “in accordance with the provisions of the 
Conventions and this Protocol.”71 On the basis of the legal framework described above and in 
particular due to the operation of common Article 9/9/9/10 of the Geneva Conventions,
72
 this 
may import yet again a condition of impartiality.
73
 If the actors in question do not meet this 
condition, the territorial State may lawfully refuse access.
74
 Nevertheless, no requirement of 
                                                          
67
 Art. 81(2) of AP I. 
68
 Art. 81(3) of AP I. 
69
 cf. Art. 81(1) of AP I. 
70
 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and A. Zimmermann, above note 20, pp. 941–942, para. 3322. 
71
 Art. 81(4) of AP I. 
72
 The article reads as follows (emphasis added):  
“The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the 
International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the 
consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their 
relief.” 
73
 cf. M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, p. 563. 
74
 In the same vein, see, e.g., ICRC, “Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of 
the United Nations”, Statement by the ICRC to the UN General Assembly, New York, 12 December 2013, 
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neutrality should be seen as imposed upon these actors by operation of the treaty framework. 
In addition, none of these requirements, applicable as they are only to Movement components 
and humanitarian organizations proper, can be extended to States or the providers of 
humanitarian action in general. 
It can be concluded that despite their frequent invocation, as a matter of treaty law, the 
significance of the principles of impartiality and neutrality is limited and mutually 
distinguishable. The legal effect of the principles is almost exclusively limited to 
humanitarian organizations and in particular to the components of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement. The effect on States is indirect only, obliging them under certain 
circumstances to accept assistance that is in line with the principles. The treaty language does 
not, however, oblige States (or parties to armed conflicts more generally) to provide 
assistance of this kind themselves.  
Although this interim conclusion may appear somewhat unsatisfying, it is congruous 
with the specific role anticipated for States under the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols. Under the treaty framework, States are primarily seen as potential belligerents and 
not as humanitarian actors in their own right. Insofar as the treaties consider the question of 
the provision of humanitarian relief, they focus not on States, but on international and 
domestic organizations such as the National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement. The specific conduct of the States in that regard is thus largely left praeter legem 
as far as the treaties are concerned.  
(Head 2) Customary international law 
It could certainly be argued that the ICJ’s intuitive conclusion in Nicaragua reflected the 
position of the States and thus amounted to a correct analysis of the applicable customary 
international law.
75
 Undoubtedly, customary law contains both rules and principles.
76
 As a 
matter of legal theory, principles are norms which “operate at a higher level of generality than 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-humanitarian-
coordination-2013-12-12.htm (“a State may refuse access to relief only for valid reasons, such as … if the relief 
being offered is not considered to be humanitarian or impartial”). 
75
 cf. V. Chetail, above note 7, p. 265; A. Gadler, above note 12, p. 228. 
76
 See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 94. 
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rules”77 and which help to explain the individual rules or provide the reason for them.78 There 
is thus no conceptual barrier to recognizing the principles of impartiality and neutrality as 
principles of customary law. However, their existence would have to be “established … in the 
same way as rules (by practice and opinio juris) or derived by extrapolation or analysis from 
such rules.”79  
(Head 3) Opinio juris 
Already the identification of the opinio juris in this connection poses considerable difficulty. 
It is true that many proclamations have been made by a plethora of actors endorsing the 
principles of impartiality and neutrality on the international plane. The UN General Assembly 
set out the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality as the “guiding principles” of 
humanitarian assistance in a non-binding resolution in 1991.
80
 In the following years, the 
General Assembly frequently reaffirmed the said principles.
81
  
                                                          
77
 International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, London, 2000, p. 11. 
78
 Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule 
of Law”, Recueil des cours, Vol. 92, 1952, p. 7. But see, e.g., Michael Scharf, Customary International Law in 
Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, 
p. 29 (arguing that the terms “norms”, “principles” and “rules” of customary law may be used interchangeably 
as normative equivalents).  
79
 H. Thirlway, above note 76, p. 94. The two traditional constituent elements of custom are (1) sufficient State 
practice backed by (2) evidence of the view that such practice is required by law (i.e. opinio juris). See further, 
e.g., James Crawford (ed.), Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 8th ed., 
2012, pp. 23–27; H. Thirlway, above note 76, pp. 56–79; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, pp. 
xxxvii–li. 
80
 UN GA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991, Annex, para. 2. 
81
 See, e.g., UN GA Res. 51/194, 10 February 1997, preambular para. 12; UN GA Res. 58/114, 17 December 
2003, preambular para. 4; UN GA Res. 60/124, 8 March 2006, preambular para. 4; UN GA Res. 61/134, 1 
March 2007, preambular para. 4; UN GA Res. 62/94, 25 January 2008, preambular para. 3; UN GA Res. 
63/139, 5 March 2009, preambular para. 3; UN GA Res. 66/119, 7 March 2012, preambular para. 3; UN GA 
Res. 69/243, 23 December 2014, preambular para. 2. 
Revised manuscript submitted to the International Review of the Red Cross (18 August 2015) 
18 
Significantly, many States have since endorsed these principles and committed 
themselves to adhere to them in undertaking humanitarian action.
82
 However, these have 
almost exclusively been western States and it would thus be premature to speak of any 
general acceptance of the said principles.
83
 In fact, when non-western States do make a 
reference to the humanitarian principles in international fora, they typically limit their import 
to international organizations and humanitarian agencies.
84
  
Moreover, with respect to those States who are member States of the European Union 
(EU), it is arguable that the statements in question are in fact referable to EU law, and not to 
international law. This is due to the operation of Article 214(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides that “Humanitarian aid 
operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law and with 
                                                          
82
 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010–2015, 
September 2009, available at: http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Det-goer-vi/Udv-
indsats/Stabilitet/StrategyforDanishHumanitarianAction2010-15.ashx, pp. 10–11; Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Field Manual—Version 1.0, 2011, 
available at: www.cdint.org/documents/PAIV_111118_Humanitarian_Access_Field Manual_mit_Inhalt.pdf, 
section 3.2; UK Department for International Development, Saving lives, preventing suffering and building 
resilience: The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy, 2011, available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-governments-humanitarian-policy-september-2011-final, p. 6; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Humanitarian Strategy, 6 July 2012, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Strategie_Humanitaire_ANGlais_2012_cle89af5f.pdf, p. 14; Federal 
Foreign Office of Germany, Strategy of the Federal Foreign Office for Humanitarian Assistance Abroad, 
November 2012, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/634144/publicationFile/177866/121115_AA-Strategie_humanitaere_hilfe.pdf, p. 
8; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Finland’s Humanitarian Policy, 14 June 2013, available at: 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=101288, p. 11. 
83
 cf. International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, London, 2000, p. 32, para. 16 (a belief on the part of the generality of States is 
sufficient to prove the existence of a customary rule). 
84
 See, e.g., United Nations Security Council (UN SC), Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7244, 19 August 2014, 
p. 14 (China) (“United Nations humanitarian agencies and relief organizations … should … uphold the 
principles of humanitarianism, namely neutrality, impartiality and independence”), p. 20 (Jordan) (“We must 
also ensure that humanitarian workers are committed to upholding the basic humanitarian principles related to 
neutrality, impartiality and independence”).  
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the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination.”85 It is thus questionable to 
what extent can States’ individual commitments be taken to signify a belief on their part that 
conduct in line with these principles would actually be required by international law. Such 
doubts remain particularly strong with respect to those States that specifically refer to the 
TFEU as the applicable legal framework.
86
  
What is more, most of the proclamations referred to above are found in documents 
designated as the individual States’ “humanitarian strategy” or “humanitarian policy”, thus 
again indicating that the commitments in question were not entered into on a legal level—in 
other words with the intention to be bound as far as international law is concerned—but only 
as a matter of policy or even international morality.
87
 
(Head 3) State practice 
Even if it could be accepted that the statements referred to above amount to opinio juris 
sufficient to justify the customary character of the principles under scrutiny, one cannot draw 
the same conclusion with respect to the parallel requirement of State practice. Although in 
general statements of the kind discussed above, States typically refer to impartiality and 
neutrality alongside one another,
88
 it is more accurate to distinguish between them as far as 
actual practice is concerned.   
First, as far as impartiality is concerned, there is strong evidence to the effect that States 
have frequently permitted extraneous considerations in addition to the simple need of the 
victims in their decision-making about the disbursement of aid. These have often featured an 
element of politicization and conditioning of aid. 
                                                          
85
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, O.J. C 115/47, 
Art. 214(2).  
86
 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Humanitarian Strategy, 6 July 2012, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Strategie_Humanitaire_ANGlais_2012_cle89af5f.pdf, p. 14. 
87
 cf. ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 43; ICJ, Nuclear Tests (New 
Zealand v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46; ILC, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral 
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 9 September 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10, principle 
1. 
88
 See sources cited in note 82 above. 
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Politicization of humanitarian action can take a number of different forms. For example, 
in a study about the instrumentalization of aid in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, 
Fiona Terry observed that western military forces “dropp[ed] pamphlets over southern 
Afghanistan that told residents they were to give information on the Taliban and Al Qaeda if 
they wished to continue receiving ‘humanitarian’ aid, and generally us[ed] aid as a tool to 
‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population”.89 Another well-documented example 
concerns the US humanitarian aid to Cambodian refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian 
border after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979.
90
 As summarized by Christine 
Mikolajuk, the assistance motivated by the US opposition to the communist government of 
Cambodia in fact served to revive the Khmer Rouge and contributed to the continuation of 
the conflict, thus worsening rather than alleviating the plight of the refugees.
91
 
A more problematic practice has been to subject the provision of humanitarian assistance 
to express conditions set by the potential donor. This is a well-accepted feature of 
international development aid
92
 but it goes against the nature of humanitarian assistance as a 
way of relieving the suffering of the victims of crisis and conflict.
93
 A prominent example in 
this regard is the withdrawal of humanitarian staff and emergency assistance from Sierra 
Leone after a coup d’état in 1997.94 The UN political leadership took the decision and the UK 
government supported it; both actors’ aim was “to try and effect the political objective of 
regime change”.95 In reality, this conditioning not only failed to bring about the intended 
                                                          
89
 Fiona Terry, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of 
Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, March 2011, p. 175. 
90
 Christine Mikolajuk, “Thanks, But No Thanks: The Other Face of International Humanitarian Aid”, Harvard 
International Review, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 33–34. 
91
 Ibid., p. 33. 
92
 See, e.g., Jonathan R. W. Temple, “Aid Conditionality”, in Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter, The 
Companion to Development Studies, 3
rd
 ed., Routledge, New York, 2014, pp. 547–551. 
93
 But see K. Mackintosh, above note 61, p. 11 (arguing that limited forms of human rights conditionality may 
be in conformity with IHL, as long as the aim of such measures is “genuinely … to improve the condition of 
individuals”). 
94
 See further Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Politics and Humanitarianism: Coherence in 
Crisis, February 2003, available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2356D2703EB313DE85257138007053DF-
politics%20and%20humanitarianism.pdf, pp. 9–12. 
95
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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political objective but it has been excoriated for contributing to the unnecessary loss of lives 
in Sierra Leone.
96
 
Although these instances have been criticized by academics and NGOs, they have not 
been subject to any international condemnation by States or inter-governmental organizations 
for failing to live up to the demands of impartiality. Hence, the recurring practice of 
politicization and conditionality of aid places significant doubts on any claim that the 
adherence to the principle of impartiality by States providing humanitarian aid has been 
“constant and uniform” as required by international law for the establishment of custom.97 
Second, the principle of neutrality has been treated even more liberally by the States. 
Writing in 1989, Professor Frits Kalshoven noted that States had frequently described as 
“humanitarian assistance” the material support provided to the sympathetic party to an armed 
conflict, in particular in the context of decolonization.
98
 He added that far from inviting any 
international condemnation, such support was welcomed by the international community as 
“a highly desirable expression of support for the cause of self-determination of the peoples 
involved”.99 
The post-Cold War era changed very little about this practice. The alliances have shifted, 
but the powerful States have generally continued playing the dual role of providing aid and 
projecting their own political aims at the same time. The United States was open about its 
aim to integrate the delivery of assistance within its counter-insurgency strategy, so much so 
that the US Secretary of State at the time Colin Powell described humanitarian agencies with 
arresting candour as “such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat 
team”.100 For instance, international “coalitions of the willing” such as the Friends of Syria 
grouping of 11 western States or the informal “Libya contact group” of about forty nations 
have been open about their aim to channel “humanitarian assistance” to the opposition in both 
                                                          
96
 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 
97
 Cf. ICJ, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 40. 
98
 F. Kalshoven, above note 20, pp. 518–519. 
99
 Ibid., p. 519. 
100
 United States, Remarks of Secretary Colin Powell to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 26 October 2001, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/powell_brief31.asp. 
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Syria and Libya.
101
 Even more recently, Russia dispatched a convoy described as carrying 
“humanitarian relief” to the separatist-controlled part of the Ukrainian territory.102  
Admittedly, it is conceivable that this conduct, while inconsistent with the principle of 
neutrality, would nonetheless not frustrate the customary status of that principle. The ICJ held 
in Nicaragua that practice corresponding with a putative rule of customary law need not be 
“in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule”; it suffices that instances of inconsistent 
conduct “should generally have been treated as breaches”.103 However, this has emphatically 
not been the case here. It is true that some of the non-neutral conduct described above was 
condemned on the international plane. In particular, the Russian “humanitarian convoy” was 
decried as tantamount to invasion by both Ukraine
104
 and a number of third States.
105
 
Notably, however, with one known exception,
106
 the condemnatory statements referred to 
other norms of international law as being violated, in particular the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Ukraine
107
 and—with respect to humanitarian assistance specifically—the 
need to secure the consent of the territorial State for any relief action.
108
 It can thus be 
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 See Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, “London 11” Friends of Syria Core Group 
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on the Start of the 
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 Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 186. 
104
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Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7289, 28 October 2014, p. 83 (Ukraine). 
105
 See, e.g., UN SC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7253, 28 August 2014, p. 3 (Lithuania), p. 7 (Australia); 
UN SC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7269, 19 September 2014, p. 14 (Lithuania). 
106
 NATO, NATO Secretary General condemns entry of Russian convoy into Ukraine, 22 August 2014, available 
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 See, e.g., UN SC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7253, 28 August 2014, p. 3 (Lithuania), p. 5 
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summarized that existing State practice with respect to the principles of impartiality and 
neutrality does not support their existence in customary international law as generally binding 
principles.
109
  
(Head 2) General principles of law 
Given that the principles have not been found to bear the force of customary law, it remains 
to be seen whether they might nevertheless be considered as “general principles of law” in 
the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Some arguments in favour of this proposition 
could certainly be made. First, since impartiality and neutrality are “principles” by their 
designation, their nature seems to be more readily aligned with the category of general 
principles of law than with any other type of sources of international law. Second, they are 
closely connected with the principle of humanity, which some
110
 have considered to have 
received legal recognition as a general principle of law by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel 
case.
111
 It could thus be argued that the same conclusion could be reached with respect to 
these two principles.
112
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The two contentions should be analysed separately. The first one is problematic in that it 
does not square with the prevailing conception of general principles of law as a source of 
international law. According to this conception, general principles are properly understood as 
“those which can be derived from a comparison of the various systems of municipal law and 
the extraction of such principles as appear to be shared by all, or a majority, of them”.113 
General principles of law are thus emphatically not moral principles or general principles of 
international relations. Significantly in this respect, impartiality and neutrality of 
humanitarian action originate on the international plane and not within the domestic legal 
systems. Their origins lie in international humanitarian law and in the activities of the 
components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
114
 Although they have now been 
adopted as guiding principles by some international organizations and even States,
115
 it can 
hardly be suggested that they can now be extracted from the domestic law of all or even just a 
majority of States, if only for the reason that most States do not in fact actively and regularly 
engage in the provision of humanitarian assistance.
116
  
The second contention requires a closer look at the ruling of the ICJ in the Corfu 
Channel case and the subsequent jurisprudence of that Court. It can be accepted arguendo
117
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(although this view is not universally endorsed
118
) that Corfu Channel recognized 
“elementary considerations of humanity” as general principles of law and applied them as a 
basis for the finding of a legal obligation in the case.
119
 Furthermore, the principles of 
humanitarian action indisputably find their basis in considerations of humanity; after all, 
“humanity” is such a principle on its own and there are many links between impartiality and 
neutrality on the one hand and humanity on the other.  
However, in the South West Africa cases, the ICJ forcefully rejected the suggestion “that 
humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to generate legal rights and 
obligations”.120 In Nicaragua, the Court further elaborated that the notion of “elementary 
considerations of humanity” had a more limited meaning which was in fact reflected in 
common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.
121
 As discussed above, this provision does not 
contain a general endorsement of the principles of humanitarian action any more than the 
other provisions in the Conventions and their Protocols.
122
 It is thus submitted that, whatever 
the true impact of the inclusion of the term “elementary considerations of humanity” in the 
Corfu Channel case was, it did not in itself serve to transform the connected notions of 
impartiality and neutrality into binding sources of international law. 
In summary, one may concede that equating humanitarian principles with general 
principles of law holds certain superficial appeal. However, closer scrutiny of the origins and 
nature of impartiality and neutrality, as well as of the relevant international jurisprudence, 
reveals that these principles do not in fact qualify as general principles of law in the sense of 
an autonomous source of international law. 
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(Head 1) Potential direct and indirect legal effect of the principles of impartiality and 
neutrality 
As seen in the previous part, the examination of the three principal sources of international 
law suggests that the ICJ’s position in Nicaragua—in particular as interpreted in subsequent 
writing
123—does not square with the current state of international law. Nevertheless, it would 
be wrong to dismiss the importance of the principles of impartiality and neutrality from the 
perspective of international law altogether. In fact, there are at least two important ways in 
which these principles may bring about significant legal effects for States in international 
law. 
(Head 2) United Nations Security Council resolutions 
First, adherence to the principles may be specifically demanded of humanitarian actors by the 
UN Security Council. On a number of occasions, the Security Council has done that, while 
expressly acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
124
 For example, in resolution 1341 
(2001) concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called 
upon “all the parties to respect the principles of neutrality and impartiality in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance”.125 Due to the operation of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are binding on all member States of the UN and 
prevail over conflicting obligations under any other agreement.
126
  
In other instances, the Council endorsed the principles of impartiality and neutrality 
(frequently alongside with other principles of humanitarian action) with lesser force. On 
some occasions, in resolutions not adopted under Chapter VII, the Council has included 
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demands that humanitarian assistance be delivered in accordance with these principles.
127
 In 
accordance with the ICJ’s ruling in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the language used in such 
resolutions supports the view that these “demands” should also be seen as binding on the 
concerned States.
128
 The view that all Council decisions are legally binding has been openly 
endorsed in the recent practice of the Council itself.
129
 In two resolutions concerning the 
situation in Syria, it “underscor[ed] that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the 
UN Charter to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions”.130  
In addition, the Council has frequently limited itself to “underscoring” or “emphasizing” 
the importance of upholding the principles of humanitarian action: at times specifically with 
respect to UN organs
131
 or humanitarian organizations,
132
 but most commonly it has done so 
in a general way without stating which actors it had in mind.
133
 However, such language is 
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probably better seen as exhortatory and thus the resolutions in question would not amount to 
creating a binding legal obligation on the member States to abide by the principles of 
humanitarian action beyond their already existing legal duties. A contrario, resolutions by 
which the Security Council “demands” or “calls on” the member States to adhere to these 
principles in the provision of humanitarian assistance have the effect of conferring binding 
force on the said principles within the scope of such resolutions. 
(Head 2) Commitments made by humanitarian organizations to respect impartiality and 
neutrality  
Second, the principles of impartiality and neutrality carry constitutional significance with 
respect to “Dunantist” humanitarian organizations.134 These organizations, such as the 
components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF), enshrine the legacy of Henry Dunant by incorporating the principles of humanitarian 
action in their constitutive documents.
135
 In addition to the two organizations already 
mentioned, several other international organizations and NGOs have likewise committed 
themselves to comply with these principles in all their humanitarian activities, with 
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prominent examples including the International Office for Migration,
136
 International Rescue 
Committee,
137
 and the World Food Programme.
138
 These self-commitments have an 
indisputable role in these organizations internally and serve as guidance for their conduct.
139
 
Moreover, initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2010) or the Core 
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (2014) further promote the principles 
to participating organizations, increasing the likelihood that “Dunantist” commitments will 
continue being made in the future, as well.
140
 
The inclusion of the principles in charters and constitutive documents of humanitarian 
organizations may also have an indirect effect on States. This is most apparent with respect to 
the components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Significantly, States agreed 
that they “shall at all times respect the adherence by all the components of the Movement to 
the Fundamental Principles” when they adopted the Statutes of the Movement in 1986.141 
Although the Statutes were not concluded in the form of an international treaty, an argument 
has been advanced as to their binding nature under international law on the basis of their 
content and method of adoption.
142
 Whatever the merits of this argument and thus 
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irrespective of the legal status of the entirety of the Statutes, the duty of  States to respect the 
commitment of the components of the Movement to adhere to their Fundamental Principles 
may also be inferred from the text of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols which 
expressly endorse these Principles.
143
  
This indirect obligation of the States has direct and observable real-world consequences. 
For instance, in the Simić case, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) inferred on this basis that the ICRC had a right to non-disclosure 
of information relating to its activities in judicial proceedings in order to effectively discharge 
its mandate.
144
 The Trial Chamber specifically held that the parties to the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols “must be taken as having accepted the fundamental 
principles on which the ICRC operates, that is impartiality, neutrality and confidentiality, and 
in particular as having accepted that confidentiality is necessary for the effective performance 
by the ICRC of its functions.”145 This reasoning led it to decide that a former ICRC employee 
should not be called as a witness in that case.
146
  
To sum up, the principles of impartiality and neutrality can be said to have an indirect 
legal effect due to the States’ duty to respect the commitment to these principles undertaken 
by certain humanitarian organizations. Nevertheless, it would be overstating the point to 
claim that the principles are “binding upon the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions 
because they were incorporated into the Statutes of the Movement.”147 It bears reminding that 
States are not members of the Movement. As such, they are merely bound to respect the 
adherence to the Fundamental Principles by the components of the Movement, but the 
Statutes do not contain a separate legal basis for a directly binding obligation for the States 
when they engage in humanitarian action themselves. 
(Head 1) Conclusion 
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In a 1979 commentary on the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross aimed at a general lay 
audience,
148
 Jean Pictet warned that: 
[W]e must avoid confusion of the principles of the Red Cross with the principles 
of international humanitarian law, mainly embodied in the Geneva Conventions 
for the protection of the victims of war. The former serve at all times to inspire the 
action of the Red Cross as a private institution, whereas the latter, which have an 
official character, regulate in wartime the conduct of States vis-à-vis their 
enemies.
149
 
It would appear that his reminder is no less relevant today than it was over 35 years ago. It is 
understandable that the indisputable moral force of the principles of impartiality and 
neutrality may at times tempt academic writers to overestimate their legal position under 
international law. The ICJ’s desire in Nicaragua to distinguish between forms of aid that are 
benign and those that amount to unlawful interference is equally comprehensible. However, 
neither of these tendencies has converted the two principles in question into norms which 
would directly, in Pictet’s turn of phrase, “regulate in wartime the conduct of States”. 
Yet, the principles have proven to have important indirect effect on the conduct of States 
in particular in their interaction with humanitarian organizations of the “Dunantist” type. 
Assistance that is provided in line with these principles is privileged and protected under IHL 
and organizations that commit themselves to the same principles may under certain 
circumstances expect privileged treatment, too. Additionally, States may find themselves 
directly affected by the two principles within the narrow confines of an appropriately worded 
binding resolution of the UN Security Council. 
Although the conclusion advocated here may at first blush find little favour with the 
proponents of the humanitarian cause, it is submitted that its consequence may in fact be 
more optimistic upon closer inspection. It would be unrealistic to expect the States to 
abandon all aid efforts undertaken as part of their counterinsurgency strategies or State-
building efforts during the time of armed conflict. As shown above, these types of assistance 
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form a central component in the States’ toolkit for the times of crisis. Still, by its nature, such 
aid cannot but deviate from strict impartiality and neutrality.  
A clue for the resolution of this conundrum may be found in repeated calls made by 
representatives of established humanitarian agencies concerned with the trend of “blurring 
the lines” between military, political, and humanitarian efforts. For instance, in December 
2009 the President of Médecins Sans Frontières told an audience composed primarily of 
NATO military personnel that “we have no principled objection to military units delivering 
aid as part of the war effort [or] to aid being part of hearts and minds campaigns”.150 What is 
key, he insisted, is that “[s]uch aid should not be attached to the term ‘humanitarian’.”151 
Similar public statements have been made on a number of occasions by leading 
representatives of the ICRC.
152
 
Although these comments were not made in relation to the legal basis of impartiality and 
neutrality, they confirm the need for a more nuanced understanding of the role these 
principles play vis-à-vis the relevant actors in modern-day conflicts. To describe them as 
generally and uniformly binding on all actors involved in the provision of aid only results in 
conceptual confusion and fruitless accusations of violation on part of those actors who cannot 
                                                          
150
 MSF, “Our Purpose is to Limit the Devastations of War: Speech by Christophe Fournier”, 8 December 2009, 
available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/speechopen-letter/our-purpose-limit-
devastations-war. 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 See, e.g., ICRC, “An ICRC Perspective on Integrated Missions: Speech by ICRC’s Vice-President Jacques 
Forstier”, Oslo, 31 May 2005, available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/6dcgrn.htm 
(“armed and police forces … should not claim that humanitarian action will “win the war” – by winning hearts 
and minds … the military, when they engage in activities of a humanitarian nature, should clearly identify 
themselves as military”); ICRC, “Humanitarian Principles – The Importance of Their Preservation During 
Humanitarian Crises: Speech by ICRC’s Director-General Angelo Gnaedinger”, Lisbon, 12 October 2007, 
available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/humanitarian-principles-statement-
121007.htm (“Armed forces also have a very important military role to play in providing security. They should 
devote their efforts to these key responsibilities and avoid blurring the line between military, political, and 
humanitarian action by labelling all of them as humanitarian.”) (emphasis original); ICRC, “World 
Humanitarian Day – Protection of Humanitarian Workers: Statement by ICRC’s President Peter Maurer to the 
United Nations Security Council”, Geneva, 19 August 2014, available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2014/08-19-world-humanitarian-day-protection.htm 
(“The Security Council should not be – and should not be expected to behave as if it were – a humanitarian 
actor, for that risks blurring further the distinction between political and humanitarian functions.”). 
A Matter of Principle(s): The Legal Effect of Impartiality and Neutrality on States as Humanitarian Actors 
33 
by the nature of some of their activities fully abide by these principles. At the same time, 
States should refrain from appropriating the terminology of humanitarian assistance for 
activities inconsistent with humanitarian principles. It needs no emphasis that doing so 
undermines genuine humanitarian efforts, creates the pretext for arbitrary refusal of aid, and 
even increases the risk that humanitarian personnel will be targeted during armed conflicts. 
As a matter of international law, the principles of impartiality and neutrality play an 
important role, although they are not endowed with general binding force. A clear 
understanding of the legal scope and impact of the two principles—in particular insofar as 
States are concerned—is essential for the accurate calibration of expectations that are 
legitimately placed on various humanitarian actors. Only this way may we, at the same time, 
advance Pictet’s call for conceptual clarity of IHL while heeding the legacy of Solferino, 
forever reminding us of the importance of principled and efficient humanitarian action. 
